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ABSTRACT: 
The capital-structure decision is one of the most fundamental issues in corporate finance. 
Numerous studies have been conducted to test the two major competing theories of capital 
structure (Trade-Off Theory and Pecking-Order Theory), yet none of these studies has analyzed 
the capital-structure decisions of small, privately held U.S. firms, which constitute the vast 
majority of all U.S. business enterprises.  In this study, we provide the first evidence on this 
important issue, utilizing data from four nationally representative surveys conducted by the 
Federal Reserve Board: the 1987, 1993, 1998 and 2003 Surveys of Small Business Finances 
(SSBF). We find that firm leverage as measured by the ratios of total loans to total assets and 
total liabilities to total assets is negatively related to firm size, age, profitability, liquidity and 
credit quality and is positively related to firm tangibility and limited liability.  In addition, we 
find that firm leverage is an increasing function of both the number of banks and the number of 
non-bank financial institutions with which the firm has business relationships.  Finally, we find 
no significant variations in firm leverage by race or ethnicity, but some evidence that female-
owned firms use less leverage.  In general, these results are broadly supportive of the Pecking-
Order Theory and inconsistent with the Trade-Off Theory. 
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What Do We Know about the Capital Structure of Privately Held Firms? 
Evidence from the Surveys of Small Business Finance  
 
1. Introduction 
According to many corporate finance textbooks, the capital structure decision is one of 
most fundamental issues facing financial managers.1 Brealey, Myers and Marcus (2005, p. 957) 
label capital structure as “one of the seven most important ideas in finance.” This seemingly 
simple decision as to the best mixture of capital sources to be employed in operating a firm has 
confounded researchers since the seminal work of Modigliani and Miller (1958).  
Existing empirical studies that test capital structure theories have relied upon data from 
large corporations with complex, publicly traded securities (see Frank and Goyal (2006) for a 
recent review).  While such large, publicly traded corporations make up the bulk of business 
assets, they make up only a small fraction of the number of business entities.  In the U.S., for 
example, there are only about 10,000 firms that issue publicly traded securities, yet, according to 
the U.S. Census, there are approximately 25 million business entities. These privately held firms 
are vital to the economy, producing as much as half of all job growth during the past decade. 
Therefore, a fundamental and unresolved issue in the finance literature is what factors determine 
the capital structure at privately held firms.  In this study, we will provide important new 
evidence on this issue based upon data from a nationally representative survey of privately held 
firms. 
 In its simplest form, the capital-structure decision is the selection by firm management of 
a debt-to-equity ratio for the firm.2  For large, publicly traded firms, this decision is complicated 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Ross, Westerfield and Jaffe (2004) or Brealey and Myers (2003). 
2 Each ratio of debt to equity maps uniquely to a ratio of debt to assets, a ratio of equity to assets 
and a ratio of assets to equity; however, corporate-finance textbooks tend to focus on the ratio of 
debt to equity when discussing capital structure. In this study, we focus on the ratio of debt to 
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along a number of different dimensions. Should the firm issue public debt or rely solely upon 
private debt? Should the firm borrow in a domestic or a foreign currency from a domestic or 
foreign lender? Should the firm issue debt with or without convertibility features?  One way to 
avoid these complications is to examine small privately held firms whose only capital-structure 
option is whether or not to borrow funds from a commercial bank or other financial intermediary.  
It is for these firms that the capital-structure decision most closely resembles the classic choice 
of a debt-to-equity ratio that is traditionally taught in the business-school classroom. 
Using data from a nationally representative sample of privately held U.S. firms, this study 
contributes to the capital-structure literature in at least three important ways.  First, we provide 
results from the first test of the two major competing hypotheses about capital structure based 
upon nationally representative data from privately held U.S. firms.3  This previously unaddressed 
segment of the market provides a new laboratory for reexamining the findings from prior studies 
that examine large, public-traded firms. Our focus on privately held firms enables us to eliminate 
the “noise” introduced by more complicated securities such as preferred stock and convertible 
bonds, reducing the errors-in-variable problems associated with empirical studies of capital 
structure at public firms.  Also, as Myers (2000) points out, capital-structure “theories are not 
designed to be general” so that “testing them on a broad, heterogeneous sample of firms can be 
uninformative.” By focusing on privately held firms, we tighten our focus to a more 
homogeneous sample: smaller firms with concentrated ownership structure that do not issue 
publicly traded securities. 
                                                                                                                                                             
assets, as it does not take on negative values, whereas each of the other ratios is a function of 
equity, which often is negative for small privately held firms. 
3 Berger and Udell (1998) discuss the distribution of debt at small U.S. firms based upon 1993 
data, but do not analyze determinant of capital structure. 
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In general, our results are broadly supportive of the Pecking-Order Theory over the 
Trade-Off Theory. We find a negative relation between firm leverage and firm size, age, 
profitability and a positive relation between firm leverage and firm liquidity, risk and tangibility 
of assets. 
Second, we provide new evidence on the degree of leverage used by privately held U.S. 
companies and how their use of leverage differs from that of small, publicly traded firms. We 
accomplish this by comparing data from our samples of privately held firms with data on small, 
publicly traded firms taken from the Compustat database. When compared with small, publicly 
traded firms, privately held firms exhibit similar leverage ratios, but this similarity does not hold 
up when we disaggregate by industry; this finding contradicts one of the key predictions of the 
Trade-Off Theory, which posits there are “target leverage ratios” that differ across industrial 
classification. 
Third, we provide new evidence on how the use of financial institutions influences capital 
structure. We test whether firms that obtain financial services from a larger pool of financial 
institutions are able to employ more leverage. We find a positive and significant relation between 
firm leverage and the number of bank and non-bank financial institutions with which the firm 
has pre-existing relationships. 
In Section 2, we review the literature on empirical tests of capital-structure theory. In 
Section 3, we describe our data. In Section 4, we present our hypotheses and describe our 
methodology. In Section 5, we present our results, followed by a summary and conclusions in 
Section 6. 
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2. Literature Review 
Almost fifty years have passed since the seminal work of Modigliani and Miller (1958 
and 1963) on the importance of capital structure.  Yet the seemingly simple question as to how 
firms should best finance their fixed assets remains a contentious issue.  The empirical evidence 
regarding a firm’s optimal mixture of financing during this time period is both voluminous and 
mixed in aggregate.4  Although there is no consensus, three competing theories—the Pecking 
Order Theory, the Trade-Off Theory, and the Market-Timing Theory—have emerged as the 
finance profession’s best explanations for the capital-structure decision. 
The Pecking-Order Theory (Myers and Majluf (1984), Myers (1984)) relies upon the 
concept of asymmetric information between managers and investors, which guides managers in 
their preference for raising funds. According to this theory, firms opt for funding from sources 
with the lowest degrees of asymmetric information because the cost of borrowing rises with this 
metric. Hence, firms opt first for internally generated funds (a form of “inside” equity), then for 
debt, and, only as a last result, for outside equity.  Hence, a firm’s capital structure is simply the 
result of previous independent decisions to raise capital; as a consequence, there is no “optimal” 
ratio of debt to equity under the Pecking-Order Theory (hereafter “POT”). 
Under the Trade-Off Theory of capital structure (hereafter “TOT”), the firm seeks to 
balance the tax benefits of using debt (which arise in the U.S. because interest payments are 
deductible business expenses while dividend payments are not) against costs of financial distress 
that rise at an increasing rate with the use of leverage.  Hence, this theory predicts an “optimal” 
ratio of debt to equity, where the tax benefits of deductible interest are just offset by the costs of 
financial distress. For public firms, Graham (2000) estimates that the tax benefits of debt are 
                                                 
4 Surveys of studies on capital structure include Bradley, Jarrell, and Kim (1984), Masulis 
(1988), Harris and Raviv (1991), Miller (1998), Myers (2001) and Frank and Goyal (2006). 
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equal to almost 10 percent of a firm’s market value. Given this idealized target, each financing 
decision by the firm is designed to move its capital structure towards this optimal ratio. 
The Market-Timing Theory of capital structure (hereafter “MTT”) is the most recent 
addition to the mix, emerging from a study by Baker and Wurgler (2002) that considers how the 
efforts of management to “time” the issuance of equity relate to the firm’s capital structure.  
According to this theory, firms will raise capital by issuing equity in hot equity markets but by 
issuing debt in cold equity markets. The resulting capital structure of a firm is simply a function 
of when they needed to raise new capital. Those needing capital during hot equity market will 
have relatively low ratios of debt to equity while those needing capital during cold equity 
markets will have relatively high ratios of debt to equity. As with the POT, there is no “optimal” 
capital structure predicted by the MTT. 
The ability to test whether or not an optimal capital structure exists for firms is 
complicated.  The presence of an optimal mixture of capital can be difficult to isolate because 
firms operating with a target capital structure in mind will be hampered by adjustment and 
transaction costs.  The continuous pricing of the firms’ debt and equity in the marketplace will 
further complicate the issue.  Moreover, the ability and speed of firms to adjust to deviations 
from their desired optimum structure also will vary.  Recent studies by Leary and Roberts 
(2005), Flannery and Rangan (2006), and Kahan and Titman (2006) bear this out and indicate the 
persistence effects documented by the market-timing hypothesis of Baker and Wurgler are 
minor, and are more likely attributable to adjustment costs as firms seek to rebalance over time 
towards their targeted “optimal” capital structure.  
Recent works by Shyam-Sunders and Myers (1999), Fama and French (2002), and 
Flannery and Rangan (2006) attempt to distinguish between the POT and TOT.  As with so many 
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previous studies on this topic, these researchers find conflicting evidence—some that supports 
and some that refutes each theory.   
The inability to differentiate between the two theories beyond stylized facts is not 
altogether surprising, however, in light of the results from Graham and Harvey (2001), who 
conducted a survey of financial executives regarding a number of finance issues. More than 
eighty percent of the respondents indicated that a “target” ratio or range of ratios guided their 
decision-making with respect to capital structure—evidence in favor of the TOT.  Yet the same 
survey also found that managers prefer to first use retained earnings for financing new projects 
and maintain financial flexibility, with a debt reserve for potential future projects—evidence in 
favor of the POT.  
Titman and Wessels (1988) and Graham and Harvey (2001) both indicate that differences 
in the utilization of debt may exist between large and small firms as a result of transaction costs.  
Since Booth et al. (2001) and Desai, Foley, and Hines (2004) find evidence of persistent 
differences in capital structure across countries, we should also expect further noise to be found 
with larger multinational firms accessing capital in different marketplaces. The novelty of using 
data from privately held firms to address the capital-structure decision is that these firms are 
devoid of many of the noise-inducing complications that afflict publicly traded firms.   
Frank and Goyal (2006) provide a summary of the existing literature on tests of the 
Trade-off and Pecking-Order theories of capital structure. They report that “there is a core set of 
seven reliable factors that are correlated with cross-sectional differences in leverage. Leverage is 
positively related to median industry leverage, collateral, log of assets, and expected inflation. 
Leverage is negatively related to market-to-book, profits, and a dummy variable for a firm 
paying dividends.” 
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To summarize, there are three major competing theories—the Pecking Order Theory, the 
Trade-Off Theory, and the Market-Timing Theory—that have emerged as the finance 
profession’s best explanations for the capital-structure decision. However, only the first two of 
these three theories are relevant for privately held firms that do not issue publicly traded 
securities, which, by itself, is strong evidence against the Market-Timing theory. In the 
remainder of this paper, we test whether the POT or the TOT better explain the capital structure 
of privately held U.S. companies. 
 
3. Data 
 To conduct this study, we utilize data from four independent, cross-sectional surveys of 
privately held U.S. firms conducted for the U.S. Federal Reserve Board and U.S. Small Business 
Administration: the 1987, 1993, 1998, and 2003 Surveys of Small Business Finance (“SSBF”).5 
In each survey, the firms surveyed constitute a nationally representative sample of “small 
businesses” operating in the U.S. as of year-end 1987/1993/1998/2003, where a “small business” 
is defined as a non-financial, non-farm enterprise employing fewer than 500 full-time equivalent 
employees. The survey data are broadly representative of approximately five million firms 
operating in the U.S. as of each survey year. In each survey, there are a very small number of 
firms that indicated they were publicly traded. We exclude these firms so that our samples 
contain only privately held firms.6 
                                                 
5  See Wolken and Elliehausen (1988), Cole and Wolken (1995), Bitler, Robb and Wolken 
(2001) and Mach and Wolken (2006) for detailed descriptions of the 1987, 1993, 1998 and 2003 
surveys, respectively. 
6 We exclude 15 (32, 10 and 9) publicly traded firms from the 1987 (1993, 1998 and 2003) 
SSBFs, respectively, so that we have a clean test of publicly traded versus privately held firms. 
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 The SSBF provides detailed information about each firm’s balance sheet and income 
statement; its credit history and use of financial services and institutions; the firm’s 
characteristics, including standard industrial classification (SIC), organizational form 
(proprietorship, partnership, LLP, LLC, S-corporation or C-corporation), and age; and 
demographic characteristics of each firm's primary owner, including race, ethnicity and gender. 
With the exception of the 1987 survey, the SSBFs also provide information on the primary 
owner’s age, education, experience, and credit history. Balance-sheet and income-statement data 
are derived from the enterprise's year-end financial statements. Credit history, firm 
characteristics, and demographic characteristics of each firm’s primary owner are taken as of 
year-end.  Each survey variable used in this study is defined in Table 1. 
 We utilize two alternative measures of capital structure in this study: the ratio of total 
loans to total assets, and the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. The ratio of total liabilities to 
total assets maps one-to-one with the ratio of debt-to-equity; hence, it corresponds to the 
traditional measure of leverage that is the focus of most textbook discussions of capital structure. 
However, total liabilities include current liabilities, which may be viewed as essential to doing 
business and, therefore, outside of the manager’s capital-structure decision. Therefore, we also 
analyze the ratio of total loans to total assets, which, for our firms, is, essentially, total liabilities 
less current liabilities, divided by total assets. In practice, both measures are highly correlated in 
each of the four SSBFs so that the results obtained using each measure are quite similar.7 
                                                 
7 Welch (2007) critiques three common flaws in empirical capital structure research, one of 
which is the use of the debt-to-asset ratio as a measure of leverage. He writes “The financial 
debt-to-asset ratio is flawed as a measure of leverage because the converse of financial debt is 
not equity. This is because most of the opposite of the financial debt-to-asset ratio is the non-
financial liabilities-to-asset ratio. This problem is easy to remedy—researchers should use a 
debt-to-capital ratio or a liabilities-to-asset ratio.” He goes on to say that flawed measures of 
leverage may be acceptable if they are highly correlated with correct measures. The correlations 
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 Frank and Goyal (2006) enumerate four major problems faced by empirical researchers 
doing cross-sectional studies of capital structure: how to define leverage (market versus book), 
how to treat panel data, how to deal with missing values and how to deal with outliers.  Because 
we are analyzing privately held firms, we have only book values of debt and equity; market 
values do not exist for these firms. Also, we do not have panel data, so we do not have to worry 
about panel-data issues, such as lack of independence across observations. With respect to 
missing values, we are fortunate that Federal Reserve Board staff already has imputed missing 
values; we rely upon their expert and well-documented efforts. With respect to outliers, we have 
chosen to winsorize problematic variables, which include each of our financial ratios. This 
involves replacing values outside of some percentile (typically, the 95th or 99th) with the value 
at that percentile. 
 We also utilize annual financial data on publicly traded firms from Compustat, extracting 
data from 1987, 1993, 1998 and 2003.8 For comparison purposes, we calculate median leverage 
ratios in each year. For purposes of testing the TOT, we calculate median leverage ratios by year 
and by one- and two-digit standard industrial classifications, which we use as proxies for “target 
leverage ratios” predicted by the TOT. 
                                                                                                                                                             
of the two leverage measures used in this study are greater than 0.80, which presumably is “high 
enough.” 
8 We select all active firms in each year with total assets (DATA6) greater than zero and 
employment (DATA29) greater than zero. For consistency with the SSBF, we delete firms in 
two-digit SIC codes less than 10, in codes 43, 60, 61, 62, 63, 67 and 86 and in codes greater than 
89. (These firms were excluded from the SSBF.) We calculate the ratio of liabilities to assets as 
total liabilities (DATA181) divided by total assets (DATA6). We calculate the ratio of loans to 
assets as the sum of long-term debt (DATA9) and short-term debt (DATA34) divided by total 
assets (DATA6). We calculate the ratio of tangible assets to total assets as gross property, plant 
and equipment (DATA7) divided by total assets (DATA6). 
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4. Hypotheses and key explanatory variables 
 According to the TOT, a firm balances the benefits from the tax deductibility of interest, 
which are substantial,9 against the costs of financial distress. The firm takes on additional debt 
until the marginal benefit of the tax shield provided by the deductibility of interest expense is 
equal to the marginal costs imposed by the increased probability of financial distress that 
accompanies higher leverage. The TOT leads to several testable hypotheses. Factors that are 
associated with higher probabilities of financial distress should be associated with lower 
leverage. Factors that are associated with greater tax benefits from the deductibility of interest 
expense should be associated with higher leverage. 
 According to the POT, asymmetric information leads the firm to a “pecking order” in its 
search for funding, first using internally generated funds (primarily retained earnings), then 
tapping private debt (primarily in the form of loans from financial institutions), and seeking 
equity from outside sources only as a last resort.10 For small, privately held firms, outside equity 
is rarely available, so the fundamental choice is between insiders’ equity and private debt.11 The 
POT also leads to several testable hypotheses. Financial slack can be used to fund projects when 
external equity is unavailable or prohibitively expensive so a firm with more financial slack 
should use less leverage. Tangible assets can be used as loan collateral so a firm with more 
tangible assets should use more leverage. To the extent that tangible assets are measured with 
error but also are correlated with industry classification, a firm in an industry with a higher 
                                                 
9 Graham (2000) estimates that tax benefits of debt are worth approximately ten percent of the 
market value of a firm. 
10 Public firms typically do not use dividend policy to adjust capital structure because dividend 
cuts are severely punished in equity markets. It is not clear if the “stickiness” of dividends also 
applies to small privately held firms.  
11 Later versions of the SSBF include a section where firms are queried about their ability to 
obtain outside equity. In the 2003 SSBF, only 68 out of 4,240 firms indicated that they were able 
to obtain outside equity during the 12 months prior to the survey. 
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portion of tangible assets should use more leverage. More profitable firms generate more internal 
fund so a more profitable firm should use less leverage. 
 In the following discussion, we limit our focus to privately held firms that choose their 
capital structure primarily by raising funds from insiders’ equity or outside private debt 
(primarily bank loans). 
 
4.1 Firm Size 
Firm size influences the probability of financial distress. Larger firms are more 
diversified and have been shown to have lower probabilities of default. Therefore, if the TOT is 
correct, then we should observe a positive relation between firm size and leverage.   
Typically, there is much more information available in the marketplace about larger firms 
than about smaller firms, so informational asymmetries between insiders and outsiders will be 
less severe at larger firms. Therefore, the POT predicts that larger firms should use 
proportionately more debt than smaller firms, also implying a positive relation between firm size 
and leverage. 
Measuring the size of privately held firms is problematic. Typically, three alternative 
variables are used in the finance and entrepreneurship literatures to measure the size of such 
firms: total assets, annual sales revenues and total employment.  Total assets is probably the most 
common measure of firm size, but, in our samples, this variable presents problems with respect 
to both missing values and outliers. First, a small portion of the firms did not report total assets to 
SSBF interviewers, forcing FRB staff to impute these values. Second, many firms that did report 
total assets reported values that appear inconsistent with other measures of size. This is 
especially problematic for very small firms in the service industries that have few assets, yet 
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generate significant sales revenues and employ many workers. Sales revenues present similar but 
less severe problems. Some firms report zero, or very small values of, sales revenues.  
Total employment presents the fewest problems in both of these respects. All firms 
reported employment, as this was a sampling criterion, and outliers are uncommon because firm 
size was limited to 500 or fewer employees.  However, the surveys had to deal with how to 
classify firms reporting zero employees—firms whose owners did all of the work. The early 
surveys replaced zero values with one-half of an employee, assuming that the owner worked at 
least part time. The 2003 survey finally recognized that zero employee firms are not unusual, and 
that owners are not “employees” as defined by employment law.  
 Because each of these size measures suffers problems, we test all three measures as 
proxies for firm size, but focus on total assets, as this is the measure most commonly used in the 
literature and is highly correlated with the other two measures. 
 
4.2 Firm Age 
Younger firms need capital to finance growth. Younger firms also are typically less 
creditworthy, less profitable and less diversified than older firms, so they have higher 
probabilities of financial distress. Therefore, the TOT predicts that younger firms should use less 
leverage, implying a positive relation between firm age and leverage.  
Younger firms have less of a track record than older firms, having had less time to 
establish a reputation, so that informational asymmetry between insiders and outsiders should be 
more severe at younger firms. According to the POT, such firms should prefer internal equity to 
private debt, implying a positive relation between firm age and leverage. However, younger 
firms have had less time to generate retained earnings and build up financial slack. According to 
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the POT, such firms should prefer private debt because they don’t have access to internally 
generated firms. Hence, the net prediction of the POT regarding the relation between firm age 
and leverage is ambiguous. 
We include the natural logarithm of firm age to perform this test. We use the log 
transformation because we expect that a one year difference in age is more important to the 
leverage of a young firm than to the leverage of an old firm. 
 
4.3 Profitability 
Firm profitability strongly influences the probability of financial distress. The more 
profitable is the firm, the less likely is the firm to default on its liabilities. In addition, the more 
profitable is the firm, the more taxes it can avoid by employing higher leverage. For both 
reasons, the TOT predicts a positive relation between firm profitability and leverage. 
The more profitable is the firm, the greater is the availability of internally generated 
funds. Therefore, the POT predicts a negative relation between firm profitability and leverage.  
In a study of firms from five developed countries, Wald (1999) finds that profitability is the 
single most important determinant of leverage, as measured by the ratio of debt to assets.  
The SSBFs provide information on the net income of the firm, which enables us to 
construct the most common measure of profitability—return on assets (ROA), which is defined 
as net income divided by total assets. However, SSBF data on profitability is noisy, with a 
significant portion of the observations requiring imputation. Therefore, as a robustness test, we 
also construct a zero-one indicator variable for profitable firms, i.e., those firms reporting profits 
greater than zero. This is a much simpler and cleaner measure of profitability than ROA.  
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4.4 Liquid Assets 
 The expected costs of financial distress will be lower for firms with a higher portion of 
their assets invested in cash, and cash-equivalent, assets. Therefore, the TOT predicts that 
leverage will be higher for firms with more liquid assets.  
 In contrast, the POT posits that firms value “financial slack” in the form of liquid assets. 
Financial slack enables firms to take advantage of unexpected investment opportunities without 
having to raise new outside capital from either the debt or equity markets. Therefore, the POT 
predicts a negative relation between liquid assets and firm leverage. We measure liquid assets 
using the ratio of cash and cash equivalents to total assets. 
 
4.5 Tangible Assets 
The expected costs of financial distress will be negatively related to the portion of a 
firm’s assets that are tangible, as these assets suffer smaller percentage losses in liquidation and 
can be pledged as collateral to obtain preferential financing. If the TOT is correct, then we 
should observe a positive relation between the ratio of tangible assets to total assets and firm 
leverage.  
Harris and Raviv (1991) argue that the problem of asymmetric information is smaller 
when a firm has more tangible assets that can readily be valued. Therefore, the POT also predicts 
that firms with more tangible assets should be able to utilize more debt, as lenders can look to the 
tangible assets as collateral without regard to asymmetric information.  This implies that firms in 
industries that typically rely upon tangible assets should have higher leverage ratios than firms in 
industries that rely upon intangible assets.  Long and Malitz (1985) find that leverage ratios are 
inversely related to the amount of the firm’s intangible assets (proxied for by R&D 
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development).  Schwartz and Aronson (1967) provide evidence of strong industry effects in debt 
ratios.   
Researchers typically measure tangible assets using the ratio of fixed assets (plant, 
property and equipment) to total assets, but some researchers also include inventory in the ratio’s 
numerator. We test both proxies for tangible assets.  
As a robustness test, we use COMPUSTAT data to calculate the industry median ratio of 
tangible assets to total assets by two-digit SIC code and use that as a proxy for each SSBF firm’s 
tangible-asset ratio.   
 
4.6 Growth Prospects 
 The expected costs of financial distress are greater for a firm with better growth 
opportunities because the value of these opportunities is an intangible asset (although not 
necessarily a book value), and much of the value of these growth opportunities is lost in financial 
distress because they cannot be funded and realized. If the TOT is correct, then we should 
observe a negative relation between proxies for growth opportunities and firm leverage.   
 Growth opportunities are notoriously difficult to value, but especially so by observers 
outside the firm, so that asymmetric information should be more severe when a firm has more 
growth opportunities. Hence, the POT also predicts that firms with better growth prospects 
would rely upon inside equity instead of private debt.  
To measure growth opportunities, we rely upon a proxy created from information on 
current and prior-period employment. We construct two dummy variables—one for firms 
reporting an increase in the number of employees and one for firms reporting a decrease in 
employment. The omitted category, which typically accounts for a majority of firms, is firms 
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reporting no change in the number of employees. This fact renders the actual change in 
employment a very noisy measure because of the large mass point at zero. Unfortunately, the 
1998 SSBF did not collect information on prior period employment so we cannot perform this 
test for that survey.  
As a robustness test, we also construct proxies for growth opportunities based upon 
current and prior-period sales. The 2003 SSBF did not collect information on the value of prior-
period sales, only whether sales revenues had increased, decreased or remained the same since 
the prior period. Therefore, we again rely upon dummy variables for positive or negative sales 
growth. 
 
4.7 Creditworthiness 
Firms that are more creditworthy have lower probabilities of financial distress. According 
to the TOT, such firms should use more leverage, so the TOT predicts a positive relationship 
between measures of credit quality and firm leverage. The POT says nothing about the 
creditworthiness of the firm, so it makes no predictions regarding the relation between credit 
quality and leverage. 
The SSBFs include several variables that provide information about the creditworthiness 
of the firm: the number of business delinquencies during the past three years, the number of 
personal delinquencies of the primary owner during the past three years, whether the firm and/or 
primary owner has declared bankruptcy within the past seven years, whether any judgments had 
been rendered against the primary owner during the past three years, whether the firm has ever 
been denied trade credit and whether the firm has paid late on its trade credit.  However, only 
one of these variables is available across all four surveys—whether or not the firm has made late 
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payments on its trade credit. Consequently, we use this as our primary measure of credit quality. 
We use the other variables as measures of robustness.  
Each of these survey variables indicates firms of lower credit quality; consequently, we 
expect that, if the TOT is correct, each of these variables should have a negative relation with 
measures of leverage. A positive relation would be inconsistent with the TOT, yet consistent 
with the POT. 
 
4.8 Industry Leverage 
 The TOT posits that firms target an “optimal” leverage ratio. According to Frank and 
Goyal (2004), the industry-median leverage ratio is a likely proxy for firms to use as their target. 
If the industry median is a good proxy for this target, and the TOT is correct, then we should 
observe a positive relation between the industry median leverage ratio and individual firm 
leverage ratios. 
To the extent that asymmetric information is related to unobservable factors that are 
correlated within industry, as seems likely, the POT at least suggests a positive relation between 
the industry-median leverage ratio and firm leverage.  
 In order to perform this test, we calculate median industry leverage ratios using data from 
Compustat firms with fewer than 500 employees; we then use these industry medians as a 
proxies for the “target” leverage ratios. 
 Below is a summary of the key predictions regarding the POT and the TOT. 
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Variables used to Explain Capital Structure at Privately Held Firms: 
Expected Signs Under Alternative Theories 
     
Variable  Pecking-Order Theory  Trade-Off Theory 
     
Firm Size  +  + 
Firm Age  ?  + 
Profitability  -  + 
Liquid Assets  -  + 
Tangible Assets  +  + 
Growth Prospects  -  - 
Creditworthiness  ?  + 
Industry “target” leverage ratios  ?  + 
 
5. Methodology 
In order to provide new evidence on the determinants of capital structure at small firms, 
we employ both univariate and multivariate techniques.  First, we calculate and analyze 
descriptive statistics (primarily the means and medians) for alternative measures of capital 
structure by selected firm and owner characteristics. Second, we estimate a weighted-least-
squares regression model of the form: 
 
Leverage  =  f (size, age, profitability, liquidity, tangible assets, 
                                     growth opportunities, credit quality, control variables)                          (1) 
 
 For control variables, we include information on the ethnicity, gender and race of the 
firm’s primary owner. Several studies in the literature (e.g., Blanchflower, Levine and 
Zimmerman (2003); Cavalluzzo and Cavalluzo (1998)) provide evidence that minority-owned 
firms are more likely to be denied credit by lenders than non-minority firms. If such firms are 
consistently denied credit based upon non-financial factors, then we should observe lower 
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leverage ratios at such firms. We include dummy variables for Asian-, Black-, Female- and 
Hispanic-controlled firms to test this proposition. 
 We also include variables that measure the number of financial institutions from which 
the firm obtains financial services. The relationship literature has established that firms having 
pre-existing relationships with financial institutions are more likely to be granted credit than 
other firms (Cole (1998); Cole, Goldberg and White (2004); Chakravarty and Yilmazer (2004)). 
Therefore, the more financial institutions with which a firm has relationships, the more credit it 
should be able to obtain and the higher its leverage ratio should be. However, other researchers 
hypothesize that lenders want exclusive relationships with their borrowers so that they can 
extract monopoly rents. If this is the case, then firms with more relationships should be able to 
obtain less credit than other firms and, consequently, have lower leverage ratios.  
We use two variables to measure the number of financial institutions: the number of 
commercial banks, and the number of financial institutions other than commercial banks, from 
which the firm obtains financial services. Non-bank financial institutions typically are finance 
companies, leasing companies or thrift institutions.  
 
6. Results 
5.1 Univariate Results 
 In Tables 2A and 2B, we present descriptive statistics for our analysis variables across 
each of the four SSBFs. Table 2A shows the medians while Table 2B shows the means from 
each of the four SSBFs for each variable. More complete descriptive statistics (number of 
observations, median, mean, standard error, minimum and maximum) appear in Appendix 
Tables 1A-D. 
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 Median leverage varied from a low of 7.5% in 2003 to a high of 25.0% in 1993 when 
measured by total loans to total assets, and from a low of 27.5% in 2003 to a high of 47.4% in 
1993 when measured by total liabilities to total assets. It is not surprising that the highest 
leverage ratios were observed during the “credit crunch” that was ongoing in 1993. 
 For comparison, we calculate the median leverage ratios for all Compustat firms and for 
Compustat firms with fewer than 500 employees (Table 3). These comparisons give us an idea of 
how similar or different are the leverage ratios of public and privately held companies. For all 
public firms, the loan-to-asset ratio (shown in Panel A) ranges from 21.1% in 1998 and 2003 to 
25.5% in 1987, and the liabilities-to-asset ratio (shown in Panel B) ranges from 37.9% in 1998 to 
56.5% in 1987.  For the small public firms, the loan-to-asset ratios range from 11.3% in 2003 to 
20.1% in 1987, and the liabilities-to-asset ratios range from 43.5% in 1998 to 56.5% in 2003. 
Hence, it appears that privately held firms employ a comparable degree of leverage relative to 
publicly traded firms of similar size when leverage is measured by the ratio of loans to assets, but 
employ less leverage when leverage is measured by the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. 
This is quite surprising, as public firms have gained access to new equity from the public 
markets, so one would expect them to use less leverage than comparable privately held firms. 
It is important to note, however, that the median number of employees for these “small” 
Compustat firms ranges from 99 to 132, while the median number of employees for the SSBF 
firms ranges from 3 to 4. As this comparison makes clear, even the smallest of publicly-traded 
firms are orders of magnitudes larger than the typical privately held firm. 
The median size for the SSBF firms ranges between $58,113 and $99,000 in terms of 
total assets, between $160,000 and $250,000 in terms of annual sales revenues and, as previously 
noted, between 3 and 4 in terms of total employment. In general, firm size declined from 1987 to 
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1993 and 1998, but rose from 1998 to 2003. In real dollar terms, these declines in assets and 
sales would be even larger, as these are nominal values.  
Median firm age increased from 10 years in 1987 to 12 years in 2003. Profitability, as 
measured by ROA, varied from 20.71% in 1987 to 33.60% in 1998. Liquidity, as measured by 
the ratio of cash to total assets, ranged from 8.47% in 1987 to a high of 11.7% in 1998. Tangible 
assets, as measured by the ratio of inventory plus plant, property and equipment to total assets, 
ranged from 54.5% in 2003 to 70.0% in 1993. 
For the remainder of the variables, which are zero-one indicator variables, the medians 
are all zero, with the exception of the numbers of financial institutions from which the firm 
obtained financial services. The median number of commercial banks was one for each of the 
four surveys, while the median number of non-banks was zero for 1987 and one for the 
remaining three surveys. 
 As shown in Table 2B, the averages for firm leverage, size, profitability and liquidity are 
much larger than the corresponding medians—evidence of the substantial skewness in these 
distributions. Average leverage rose in each survey year, from 31.2% in 1987 and 61.4% in 2003 
when measured by total loans to total assets; and from 48.7% in 1987 to 84.8% in 2003 when 
measured by total liabilities to total assets.  The average size ranges from $425,000 to $568,000 
as measured by total assets, from $1.00 million to $1.25 million as measured by annual sales and 
from 8.5 to 11.1 as measured by total employment. Average profitability varied from 55.7% in 
1987 to 87.3% in 1998. Average liquidity was between 16.2% in 1987 and 24.3% in 1998.12  
                                                 
12 In each survey, we winsorize financial ratios to mitigate the effect of large outliers in the data. 
Both measures of leverage are winsorized at the 95% percentiles, while both ROA and the ratio 
of cash to assets are winsorized at the 99% percentiles. 
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Average tangible assets ranged from 51.3% in 2003 to 65.6% in 1993. Credit quality, as 
measured by the percentage of firms paying late on their trade credit accounts, improved from 
1987 to 2003, declining from 42.0% to 24.7% of all firms. 
 The average number of commercial banks from which a firm obtained financial services 
declined from 1.317 in 1987 to 1.246 in 2003, while the number of nonbanks rose from 0.725 to 
1.165. The total number of financial institutions used (both bank and nonbank) rose from 2.042 
in 1987 to 2.411 in 2003, indicating that the increase in use of nonbanks more than offset the 
decline in the use of commercial banks. 
 The period from 1987-2003 saw dramatic changes in organizational form, as the 
percentage of firms organized as C-corporations declined from 39.2% to 14.6%, while the 
percentage organized as S-corporations rose from 12.4% to 31.4%. The percentage of 
partnerships remained relatively constant at 8%-9%, while the percentage of proprietorships rose 
slightly from 40% to 44%. The 1998 and 2003 surveys also provide information on firms 
organized as limited-liability corporations, which was 0.8% in 1998 and 1.4% in 2003. (In this 
table, limited-liability partnerships are aggregated with regular partnerships.) 
 There also were dramatic changes from 1987 to 2003 in the distribution of small firms by 
gender, race and ethnicity. The percentage of female-owned firms increased from 13.8% to 
25.8%; the percentage of Asian-owned firms grew from 3.0% to 4.5%; the percentage of Black-
owned firms grew from 2.3% to3.8%; and the percentage of Hispanic-owned firms grew from 
2.0% to 4.3%.13 
 We also see significant changes in the distribution of firms by industry over the 1987-
2003 period. Firms in Retail Trade (SIC 52-59) and Wholesale Trade (SIC 50-51) declined from 
                                                 
13 In this table, owners who are Black and Hispanic are included only in the Black category so 
that the statistics for Hispanics are biased downwards slightly. 
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26.4% to 18.6% and from 10.0% to 6.0%, respectively, while firms in Business Services (SIC 
70-79) and Professional Services (SIC 80-89) rose from 18.4% to 24.9%, and from 13.2% to 
20.7%, respectively. 
 In Tables 4A and 4B, we present median leverage ratios broken out by selected firm and 
owner characteristics. In Table 4A are the medians for the ratio of total loans to total assets. For 
the full SSBF samples, median loan-to-asset ratios were 17.7% in 1987, 25.1% in 1993, 9.2% in 
1998 and 7.4% in 2003.  Panel A of Table 4A breaks down the sample firms by organizational 
form and shows that Proprietorships use far less leverage than do any of the organizational forms 
that enjoy limited liability. This is not surprising, as proprietors are personally liable for the 
liabilities of their firms, whereas the owners of corporations and partnerships (except for the 
general partner) are not. The median proprietorship used no loans in 1998 and 2003, but 
borrowed 19.6% of assets in 1993, during the height of the 1990s “credit crunch.” S-corporations 
used the greatest percentage of loans in every year (28.4% in 1987, 35.2% in 1993 and 25.7% in 
1998) except for 2003, when C-corporations were most highly levered at 26.1%. Partnership 
leverage was comparable to corporate leverage in 1987 and 1993, and fell between corporate 
leverage and proprietorship leverage in 1998 and 2003. 
 Panel B of Table 4A breaks down the sample into asset quartiles. In 1987, 1998 and 
2003, we see a monotonic relation between size and leverage, with larger firms using more 
leverage. In each of these years, the median firm in the smallest quartile used no leverage, while 
the median firm in the largest quartile borrowed loans equal to 20.6%-27.3% of assets. During 
the credit crunch survey year of 1993, this relation was reversed, with the largest firms using the 
least leverage and smaller firms using the most leverage. 
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 Panel C of Table 4A breaks survey samples down by firm age: 0-5, 6-10, 11-20 and 21 
plus years old. These correspond roughly, but not exactly, to age quartiles. In each survey, we 
see a negative monotonic relation between firm age and leverage. The oldest firms report the 
lowest ratios of loans to assets, while the youngest firms report the highest ratios of loans to 
assets. There is one exception, in 1998, when the youngest firms reported less leverage than any 
group except for the 21-plus year-old firms. As with other breakdowns, leverage ratios are 
uniformly higher in 1993 than other years. 
 Panel D of Table 4A breaks down the samples by race: Asian, Black, White Hispanic, 
White Non-Hispanic, and Other. In general, minority-owned firms report lower median leverage 
ratios than White Non-Hispanic firms.  Panel E of Table 3A breaks down the samples by gender. 
Female-owned firms use less leverage than male firms in each year, but these differences are 
greatest in 1998 and 2003, when female firms used virtually no loans while male firms used 
loans equal to 11 percent of assets. 
 In Table 4B are the medians for the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. For the full 
SSBF samples, median liability-to-asset ratios were 39.4% in 1987, 47.4% in 1993, 34.7% in 
1998 and 27.5% in 2003. The results by organizational form, asset size, firm age and race, 
ethnicity and gender are qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 4A.  
 
5.2 Multivariate Results 
 In Tables 5A and 5B, we present the results of weighted-least-squares regression analysis 
where the dependent variable is either the ratio of total loans to total assets (Table 5A) or the 
ratio of total liabilities to total assets (Table 5B). Each observation is weighted by its survey 
sampling weight, which is the inverse of its selection probability for that sample. This weighting 
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enables us to use our results to make inferences about the target population, rather than the 
survey sample. 
 In Table 5A are the results for leverage as measured by the ratio of total loans to total 
assets, where the upper tail of the distribution has been winsorized at the 99th percentile. With 
respect to firm characteristics, the results are remarkably consistent across the four surveys. For 
many of these variables, the signs are consistent and the coefficients are statistically significant 
at better than the 0.05 level across each of the four surveys.  
 Firm size, as measured by the natural logarithm of total assets, is inversely related to firm 
leverage, and this relation is significant at better than the 0.001 level in each survey. In other 
words, larger firms use significantly less debt in their capital structure. This result is at odds with 
what Frank and Goyal (2006, p. 64) cite as one of the “core set of seven factors that are 
correlated with cross-sectional differences in leverage.” Cross-sectional studies of publicly-
traded firms find that leverage is “robustly related” to firm size, as measured by the log of assets. 
Clearly, this result does not hold for privately held firms. This result also is inconsistent with the 
TOT, which predicts larger firms should use more leverage than smaller firms. The POT is 
ambiguous with respect to the effect of firm size on leverage. 
 Firm age, as measured by the natural logarithm of firm age, also is inversely related to 
firm leverage. In each of the four surveys, the relation is significant at better than the 0.001 level. 
Older firms use less debt in their capital structure. This result is inconsistent with the TOT, 
which predicts that older firms should be more highly levered than their younger counterparts. 
The POT is ambiguous with respect to the effect of firm age on leverage. 
 Profitability, as measured by the winsorized return on assets, shows a consistent negative 
relation with the loan-to-asset ratio. The coefficients for ROA are significant at the 0.05 level for 
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three of the four surveys, with 1998 being the exception. As a robustness test (not shown in 
Table 5), we replace ROA with a simple zero-one indicator for profitable firms. We find that this 
variable has a negative and highly significant coefficient in each of the four surveys.  These latter 
findings are strongly supportive of the POT, which predicts that profitable firms use less debt 
because they can fund projects with retained earnings, but is inconsistent with the TOT, which 
predicts that profitable firms use more debt to take advantage of the debt tax shield, and because 
they have lower probability of financial distress. 
 Liquidity, as measure by the winsorized ratio of cash to total assets, is inversely related to 
firm leverage in each of the four surveys, and this relation is statistically significant at better than 
the 0.01 level in each survey, except for 2003, where it is significant at the 0.05 level. The 
coefficient ranges from -0.199 to -0.347, indicating that a 100 basis point increase in the ratio of 
cash to assets reduces the ratio of debt to assets by 20 to 35 basis points. This result is supportive 
of the POT, which predicts that firms with more liquid assets have financial slack that can be 
used in place of new debt to fund unexpected investment opportunities; and is inconsistent with 
the TOT, which predicts that firms with more liquid assets have a lower probability of financial 
distress and should use more leverage. 
 Tangibility, as measured by the ratio of property, plant and equipment to total assets, is 
positive across each of the four surveys and is statistically significant at better than the 0.05 level 
for each survey excepting 2003. The coefficients range from 0.073 to 0.171, indicating that a 100 
basis point increase in the tangible asset ratio is associated with a 7.3 to17.1 basis point increase 
in the loan-to-asset ratio. According to Frank and Goyal (2006, p. 39), the relation between 
tangibility and leverage is reliably positive in cross-sectional studies of publicly traded firms. 
Our results for privately held firms are broadly consistent with this finding. 
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 Creditworthiness, as measured by Trade Credit Paid Late, is positively related to firm 
leverage. Firms indicating that they made late payments on their trade credit accounts have 
consistently higher ratios of debt to assets than other firms.  The coefficient on this variable is 
significant at the 0.001 level for three of the four surveys, with 1993 being the exception. The 
coefficient ranges from 0.008 to 0.268, indicating that the debt-to-asset ratios were 0.8 to 26.8 
percentage points higher for such firms. Similar results are obtained for firms reporting that they 
were delinquent on their business obligation, but this variable is not available from the 1987 
survey. In general, these results are inconsistent with the TOT because these firms have higher 
probabilities of financial distress.   Because the POT says nothing about creditworthiness, the 
results do not contradict the POT. 
 Target leverage ratios, as proxied by the Compustat median-industry leverage ratios, are 
not significantly different from zero in any of the four surveys (not shown in Table 5). This is 
inconsistent with the TOT and with evidence from cross-sectional studies of leverage at publicly 
traded corporations. Frank and Goyal (2006, p. 41) report that median industry leverage is one of 
the “core set of seven reliable factors that are correlated with cross-sectional differences 
leverage.” 
 Moving on to the relationship variables, we find that the debt-to-asset ratio is positively 
related to both the number of commercial banks and to the number of non-banks from which the 
firm obtains financial services. These results are statistically significant at better than the 0.001 
level in each of the four surveys. The coefficients range from 0.049 to 0.216, indicating that a 
firm could increase its debt-to-asset ratio by 4.9 to 21.6 percentage points by establishing a new 
relationship with one new financial institution. In general, the results are stronger for 
relationships with financial institutions other than commercial banks. 
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 With respect to organizational form, the coefficients on both S-corporations and 
C-corporations are positive and significant at better than the 0.01 level in each period. These 
variables show the additional leverage used by corporations relative to the omitted category—
proprietorships. The coefficients indicate that corporations have debt to asset ratios that are 3.5 to 
48.1 percentage points higher than proprietorships. These results are consistent with the findings 
regarding organizational form shown in Table 2A. The coefficients on partnerships are positive 
in each period, and significant in each period except for 1993, indicating that partnerships also 
use more leverage than proprietorships but less than corporations. These findings are consistent 
with the limited liability protection offered by the differing organizational forms—none for 
proprietorships, limited for partnerships and full for corporations. Results for LLCs are only 
available from the 1998 and 2003 surveys. The coefficient is large, positive and significant in 
1998, but slightly negative and insignificant in 2003. These results are due to small sample sizes 
and large variation among LLCs. 
 Results for race and ethnicity of the firm’s primary owner are generally insignificant. 
Only the 1993 coefficient for Black-owned firms is statistically significant at better than the 0.05 
level. By gender, both the 1993 and 2003 coefficients for female owned firms are negative and 
significant. The result for 2003 is highly significant with a t-statistic of 5.08 and a coefficient of 
-0.289, indicating that female-owned firms had loan-to-asset ratios that were 28.9 percentage 
points lower than those for male-owned firms. By industry, there are no consistent results, 
although several individual coefficients are significant in each year. 
 Table 5B presents WLS regression results where leverage is measured by the winsorized 
ratio of total liabilities to total assets. In general, the results are qualitatively similar to those in 
Table 5A. This is not surprising, as the correlation coefficients for our two measures of leverage 
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are greater than 0.80 in each of the four surveys. One notable exception is profitability, as 
measured by winsorized return on assets. The coefficient on ROA is negative and significant in 
1987, negative and insignificant in 1993 and 2003, but positive and significant in 1998.  
However, when we replace ROA with a simple zero-one indicator variable for profitable firms, 
we find a positive and highly significant relation between profitability and leverage in each of 
the four surveys. This is supportive of the POT and inconsistent with the TOT. 
 
5.3 Robustness Tests of Multivariate Results 
 Not shown in the tables are results where we replace the natural logarithm of total assets 
with the natural logarithm of annual sales revenue and the natural logarithm of total employment.  
In both cases, the results are essentially unchanged, although the adjusted R2 falls by more than 
half.  These results confirm that leverage is inversely related to firm size, even when size is 
measured by sales or employment rather than assets.  They also confirm that results for other 
variables are independent of our measure of firm size. 
 We also replace our measure of firm age (natural logarithm of firm age) with a series of 
zero-one indicator variables for firms age 0-5, 6-10, 11-20 and 21-plus.  In this specification, 
only the dummy variable for the youngest firms aged zero to five years is statistically significant. 
The coefficient is positive and in the range of 0.20, indicating that young firms have leverage 
ratios that are 20 percentage points higher than older firms. 
 For each survey, except for 1987, we replace the dummy variable for Trade Credit Paid 
Late with a dummy variable indicating that the firm was at least 60 days delinquent upon a 
business obligation at some time during the past three years. Like Trade Credit Paid Late, this 
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variable for Delinquent Business Obligation is positive and significant at better than the 0.001 
level in each period, indicating that firms with lower quality use more leverage. 
 We include dummy variables indicating whether the firm does business primarily locally, 
regionally, nationally, or internationally. In1987, 1993 and 2003, we find that firms doing 
business primarily nationally, or primarily internationally, have significantly higher leverage 
ratios than other businesses. The variables are not significant in the 1998 survey. 
 We include a dummy variable indicating that the firm’s primary owner used her personal 
credit card(s) for business purposes. In each of the three surveys for which this measure is 
available, we find that such firms have significantly higher leverage ratios than firms whose 
primary owned does not use personal credit card(s) for business purposes. (This variable is not 
available in the 1987 SSBF). 
Finally, we rerun our analyses limiting our sample to corporations (S-corporations, C-
corporations and LLCs) because our analysis in Tables 4 and 5 indicate highly significant 
differences in the leverage of proprietorships and corporations. Our results using the ratio of total 
loans to total assets appear in Table 6, Panel A, and our results using the ratio of total liabilities 
to total assets appear in Table 6, Panel B. Surprisingly, our results for both measures of leverage 
are, in general, not qualitatively different from those appearing in Table 5, Panels A and B. 
 
7. Summary and Conclusions 
 The capital-structure decision is one of the most fundamental issues in corporate finance. 
Numerous studies have been conducted to test the two major competing theories of capital 
structure—the Trade-Off Theory and the Pecking-Order Theory—yet none of these studies has 
analyzed the capital-structure decisions of privately held U.S. firms, which constitute the vast 
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majority of all U.S. business enterprises.  In this study, we provide the first evidence on this 
important issue, utilizing data from four nationally representative surveys conducted by the 
Federal Reserve Board: the 1987, 1993, 1998 and 2003 Surveys of Small Business Finances 
(SSBF).  
Our results show that firm leverage, as measured by the ratios of total loans to total assets 
and total liabilities to total assets, is negatively related to firm size, age, profitability, liquidity 
and credit quality, and is positively related to firm tangibility and limited liability.  In addition, 
we find that firm leverage is an increasing function of both the number of banks and the number 
of non-bank financial institutions with which the firm has business relationships.  Finally, we 
find no significant variations in firm leverage by race or ethnicity, but some evidence that 
female-owned firms use less leverage.  In general, these results are broadly supportive of the 
Pecking-Order Theory and inconsistent with the Trade-Off Theory. 
Our results contribute to the literature on capital structure and relationship lending in at 
least four important ways. First, we provide results from the first test of the major competing 
hypotheses about capital structure based upon data from privately held U.S. firms.  Previous 
research has relied upon data  from publicly traded corporations, where the capital-structure 
decision is complicated by the wide variety of debt and equity instruments used by large firms. 
Second, we provide new evidence on the degree of leverage used by privately held companies 
and how their use of leverage differs from small publicly traded firms. This is important to any 
assessment of how economic shocks may affect privately held firms. Third, we provide new 
evidence on how the use of financial institutions influences capital structure. Fourth, we pool 
data from four different surveys collected over 15 years that span at least two business cycles, 
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which enables us to provide new evidence on how macro-economic conditions influence the 
capital-structure decision of privately held firms. 
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Table 1 
Definitions of Variables Used to Explain Capital Structure 
  
(Data are taken from the 1987, 1993, 1998 and 2003 Surveys of Small Business Finances) 
 
Variable  
Firm Characteristics  
Leverage ratio 1 Total loans divided by total assets 
Leverage ratio 2 Total liabilities divided by total assets 
Assets Total assets 
Sales Annual sales revenues 
Employment Total full-time equivalent employment 
Firm Age Age of the firm in years 
ROA Net income divided by total assets 
Liquid Assets Cash divided by total assets 
Tangible Assets Sum of inventory and property, plant and equipment divided by total assets 
Growth Prospects 
Dummy variables for firms with positive and negative Employment growth 
during previous three years. (No growth is omitted category.)  
Firm Delinquent on Business 
Obligation 
Firm has been 60+ days delinquent on a business obligation during previous 
three years 
Trade Credit Paid Late 
During the year, the firm has made payments on a trade credit account after 
the bill was due in full. 
Number of Banks Number of commercial banks from which the firm obtains financial services. 
Number of Nonbanks 
Number of financial institutions other than commercial banks from which the 
firm obtains financial services. 
Number of Fin'l Institutions 
Number of financial institutions including commercial banks from which the 
firm obtains financial services. 
C-Corporation Firm files taxes as a C-corporation. 
S-Corporation Firm files taxes as an S-corporation. 
LLC Firm files taxes as a Limited Liability Corporation. 
Partnership Firm files taxes as a Partnership or Limited Liability Partnership. 
Proprietorship Firm files taxes as a Proprietor 
Owner's Race, Ethnicity and Gender  
Female Owner At least 51% of the firm is owned by a female. 
Asian Owner At least 51% of the firm is owned by an Asian. 
Black Owner At least 51% of the firm is owned by a Black. 
Hispanic Owner At least 51% of the firm is owned by an Hispanic. 
Industrial Classification  
SIC 1 Firm is in SIC 10-19: Mining and Construction 
SIC 2 Firm is in SIC 20-29: Primary Manufacturing 
SIC 3 Firm is in SIC 30-39: Secondary Manufacturing 
SIC 4 Firm is in SIC 40-49: Transportation, Communication and Utilities 
SIC 51 Firm is in SIC 50-51: Wholesale Trade 
SIC 52 Firm is in SIC 52-59: Retail Trade 
SIC 6 
Firm is in SIC 64-67: Insurance and Real Estate (other financial service firms 
were excluded from the SSBF). 
SIC 7 Firm is in SIC 70-79: Business Services 
SIC 8 Firm is in SIC 80-89: Professional Services 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics for Variables Used to Explain Capital Structure 
Panel A: Variable Medians 
(Data are taken from the 1987, 1993, 1998 and 2003 Surveys of Small Business Finances) 
          
  1987  1993  1998  2003  
Variable  Median  Median  Median  Median  
Firm Characteristics          
Loans to Assets  0.177  0.251  0.092  0.074  
Liabilities to Assets  0.394  0.474  0.347  0.275  
Total Assets           99,000           69,435           58,113  72,000  
Sales         250,000         190,000         160,000  200,000  
Employment  4  3  3  3  
Firm Age  10  11  11  12  
ROA  0.2071  0.213  0.336  0.287  
Cash to Total Assets  0.0847  0.108  0.117  0.105  
Tangible Assets to Total Assets 0.6667  0.700  0.558  0.545  
Employment Growth is Positive 0  0  0  0  
Employment Growth in Negative 0  0  0  0  
Firm Delinquent on Business Obligation n/a  0  0  0  
Trade Credit Paid Late  0  0  0  0  
Number of Banks  1  1  1  1  
Number of Nonbanks  0  1  1  1  
Number of Fin'l Institutions  2  2  2  2  
C-Corporation  0  0  0  0  
S-Corporation  0  0  0  0  
LLC  N/A  N/A  0  0  
Partnership  0  0  0  0  
Proprietorship  0  0  0  0  
Owner's Race, Ethnicity and Gender         
Female Owner  0  0  0  0  
Asian Owner  0  0  0  0  
Black Owner  0  0  0  0  
Hispanic Owner  0  0  0  0  
Industrial Classification          
SIC 1  0  0  0  0  
SIC 2  0  0  0  0  
SIC 3  0  0  0  0  
SIC 4  0  0  0  0  
SIC 51  0  0  0  0  
SIC 52  0  0  0  0  
SIC 6  0  0  0  0  
SIC 7  0  0  0  0  
SIC 8  0  0  0  0  
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics for Variables Used to Explain Capital Structure 
Panel B: Variable Means 
(Data are taken from the 1987, 1993, 1998 and 2003 Surveys of Small Business Finances) 
          
  1987  1993  1998  2003  
Variable  Mean  Mean  Mean  Mean  
Firm Characteristics          
Loans to Assets  0.312  0.354  0.399  0.614  
Liabilities Assets  0.487  0.561  0.756  0.849  
Total Assets  476,254  488,844  424,989   567,881  
Sales  1,251,382  1,001,330  1,005,846  1,098,386  
Employment  11.145  8.494  8.715  8.736  
Firm Age  13.265  14.284  13.392  14.381  
ROA  0.557  0.690  0.873  0.749  
Cash to Total Assets  0.162  0.197  0.243  0.225  
Tangible Assets to Total Assets  0.6150  0.656  0.520  0.513  
Employment Growth is Positive  0.2421  0.377  n/a  0.154  
Employment Growth is Negative  0.1247  0.268  n/a  0.077  
Firm Delinquent on Business Obligation N/A  0.190  0.136  0.159  
Trade Credit Paid Late  0.420  0.363  0.270  0.247  
Number of Banks  1.317  1.262  1.226  1.246  
Number of Nonbanks  0.725  0.844  0.839  1.165  
Number of Fin'l Institutions  2.042  2.106  2.065  2.411  
C-Corporation  0.392  0.284  0.193  0.146  
S-Corporation  0.124  0.203  0.243  0.314  
LLC  N/A  N/A  0.008  0.014  
Partnership  0.081  0.080  0.068  0.086  
Proprietorship  0.403  0.432  0.488  0.440  
Owner's Race, Ethnicity and Gender        
Female Owner  0.138  0.206  0.238  0.258  
Asian Owner  0.030  0.036  0.043  0.045  
Black Owner  0.023  0.029  0.040  0.038  
Hispanic Owner  0.020  0.043  0.056  0.043  
Industrial Classification          
SIC 1  0.131  0.142  0.119  0.116  
SIC 2  0.042  0.039  0.038  0.031  
SIC 3  0.048  0.042  0.047  0.041  
SIC 4  0.029  0.028  0.037  0.039  
SIC 51  0.100  0.085  0.072  0.060  
SIC 52  0.264  0.217  0.192  0.186  
SIC 6  0.068  0.071  0.064  0.070  
SIC 7  0.184  0.211  0.246  0.249  
SIC 8  0.132  0.166  0.183  0.207  
 
SIC Industry Compustat Compustat SSBF Compustat Compustat SSBF Compustat Compustat SSBF Compustat Compustat SSBF
< 500 Emp < 500 Emp < 500 Emp < 500 Emp
1 Construction 0.234 0.168 0.087 0.276 0.222 0.133 0.192 0.133 0.199 0.215 0.158 0.128
2 Primary Manufacturing 0.214 0.096 0.207 0.208 0.073 0.122 0.166 0.089 0.317 0.216 0.106 0.183
3 Secondary Manufacturing 0.163 0.073 0.108 0.185 0.083 0.161 0.170 0.104 0.225 0.209 0.190 0.233
4 Transportation 0.341 0.296 0.280 0.357 0.315 0.320 0.348 0.341 0.348 0.360 0.342 0.215
5.1 Wholesale Trade 0.239 0.220 0.091 0.256 0.135 0.160 0.277 0.238 0.200 0.286 0.300 0.189
5.2 Retail Trade 0.189 0.203 0.141 0.218 0.224 0.102 0.202 0.227 0.276 0.255 0.217 0.192
6 Financial Services 0.216 0.258 0.060 0.303 0.277 0.209 0.192 0.258 0.366 0.300 0.428 0.293
7 Business Services 0.114 0.073 0.030 0.111 0.069 0.017 0.119 0.064 0.245 0.185 0.194 0.215
8 Professional Services 0.184 0.153 0.00 0.201 0.145 0.027 0.238 0.204 0.243 0.238 0.154 0.082
All Firms 0.211 0.113 0.075 0.222 0.114 0.092 0.211 0.133 0.250 0.255 0.201 0.177
2003 1998 1993 1987
Table 3:
Median Ratios of Total Loans to Total Assets by One-Digit Standard Industrial Classification
Compustat vs. SSBF
For each year, the first column presents the median ratio for all Compustat firms, the second column presents the median ratios for Compustat firms with fewer than 500 employees 
and the third column presents the weighted median ratio for all SSBF firms. Ratios are presented for 1987, 1993, 1998 and 2003. SIC5 is split into two groups--retail trade and 
wholesale trade. SIC6 excludes depository institutions (two digit SIC codes 60-63 and 67) as the SSBF excluded these firms
Panel A
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SIC Industry Compustat Compustat SSBF Compustat Compustat SSBF Compustat Compustat SSBF Compustat Compustat SSBF
< 500 Emp < 500 Emp < 500 Emp < 500 Emp
1 Construction 0.515 0.461 0.325 0.522 0.450 0.421 0.475 0.357 0.488 0.539 0.414 0.372
2 Primary Manufacturing 0.521 0.341 0.357 0.505 0.302 0.468 0.477 0.297 0.554 0.510 0.347 0.363
3 Secondary Manufacturing 0.469 0.377 0.371 0.463 0.356 0.409 0.465 0.379 0.491 0.491 0.424 0.432
4 Transportation 0.689 0.652 0.363 0.661 0.649 0.619 0.648 0.624 0.622 0.625 0.603 0.313
5.1 Wholesale Trade 0.608 0.598 0.416 0.556 0.469 0.450 0.610 0.612 0.531 0.590 0.514 0.489
5.2 Retail Trade 0.503 0.566 0.343 0.520 0.514 0.357 0.480 0.452 0.458 0.549 0.491 0.410
6 Financial Services 0.635 0.640 0.240 0.625 0.621 0.378 0.578 0.579 0.500 0.625 0.641 0.517
7 Business Services 0.529 0.534 0.200 0.486 0.436 0.246 0.471 0.454 0.463 0.498 0.471 0.430
8 Professional Services 0.555 0.542 0.185 0.557 0.555 0.238 0.527 0.399 0.430 0.571 0.461 0.208
All Firms 0.447 0.565 0.275 0.379 0.435 0.347 0.538 0.484 0.474 0.565 0.476 0.394
Table 3:
Median Ratios of Total Liabilities to Total Assets by One-Digit Standard Industrial Classification
Compustat vs. SSBF
For each year, the first column presents the median ratio for all Compustat firms, the second column presents the median ratios for Compustat firms with fewer than 500 
employees and the third column presents the weighted median ratio for all SSBF firms. Ratios are presented for 1987, 1993, 1998 and 2003. SIC5 is split into two groups--retail 
trade and wholesale trade. SIC6 excludes depository institutions (two digit SIC codes 60-63 and 67) as the SSBF excluded these firms
Panel B
2003 1998 1993 1987
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Table 4 
Median Capital Structure Ratios by Selected Firm and Owner Characteristics 
Panel A: Capital Structure as Measured by the Ratio of Total Loans to Total Assets 
(Data are taken from the 1987, 1993, 1998 and 2003 Surveys of Small Business Finances) 
  
Variable  1987 SSBF  1993 SSBF  1998 SSBF  2003 SSBF 
   Obs  Median   Obs  Median   Obs  Median  Obs Median 
             
All Firms   3,224  0.177   4,637  0.251   3,485  0.092   4,163  0.074 
             
Organizational Form            
Proprietorship   1,195  0.051   1,492  0.196   1,375  0.000  1,298 0.000 
Partnership or LLP     255  0.245      337  0.259      218  0.182  337 0.141 
S-Corporation      449  0.284   1,100  0.352   1,013  0.257  1,532 0.237 
C-Corporation   1,325  0.236   1,708  0.254      851  0.231  941 0.261 
LLC   N/A   N/A        28  0.538  55 0.169 
             
Asset Quartile             
1 (Largest)      806  0.273   1,160  0.207      871  0.215  1,040 0.206 
2      806  0.241   1,159  0.255      870  0.184  1,041 0.215 
3      806  0.181   1,159  0.266      871  0.129  1,041 0.115 
4 (Smallest)      806  0.000   1,159  0.264      873  0.000  1,041 0.000 
             
Firm Age             
0 - 5 Years      861  0.294      956  0.364      890  0.087  820 0.141 
6  - 10 Years      738  0.189   1,152  0.280      707  0.161  797 0.128 
11 - 20 Years      921  0.177   1,433  0.235   1,050  0.106  1,235 0.062 
21 + Years      704  0.055   1,096  0.182      838  0.022  1,311 0.033 
             
Race/Ethnicity             
Asian        63  0.144      308  0.248      199  0.036  165 0.111 
Black        53  0.084      442  0.211      259  0.027  119 0.000 
Hispanic        50  0.211      291  0.222      243  0.046  146 0.018 
White   2,984  0.188   3,559  0.256   2,745  0.098  3,616 0.074 
Other        74  0.091        37  0.237        39  0.154  117 0.512 
             
Gender             
Male   2,822  0.187   3,797  0.254   2,722  0.110  3,275 0.111 
Female      402  0.114      840  0.226      763  0.006  888 0.000 
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Table 4 
Median Capital Structure Ratios by Selected Firm and Owner Characteristics 
Panel B: Capital Structure as Measured by the Ratio of Total Liabilities to Total Assets 
(Data are taken from the 1987, 1993, 1998 and 2003 Surveys of Small Business Finances) 
 
Variables  1987 SSBF  1993 SSBF  1998 SSBF  2003 SSBF 
    Obs  Median   Obs  Median   Obs  Median  Obs Median 
             
All Firms   3,224  0.394    4,637  0.474   3,485  0.347   4,163  0.275 
             
Organizational Form            
Proprietorship   1,195  0.223    1,492  0.414   1,375  0.111  1,298 0.080 
Partnership or LLP     255  0.414       337  0.428      218  0.400  337 0.313 
S-Corporation      449  0.542    1,100  0.578   1,013  0.558  1,532 0.500 
C-Corporation   1,325  0.481    1,708  0.515      851  0.536  941 0.555 
LLC   N/A   N/A        28  0.577  55 0.459 
             
Asset Quartile             
1 (Largest)      806  0.545    1,160  0.500      871  0.436  1,040 0.448 
2      806  0.444    1,159  0.448      870  0.414  1,041 0.386 
3      806  0.356    1,159  0.457      871  0.381  1,041 0.271 
4 (Smallest)      806  0.222    1,159  0.512      873  0.025  1,041 0.069 
             
Firm Age             
0 - 5 Years      861  0.529       956  0.563      890  0.421  820 0.451 
6  - 10 Years      738  0.414    1,152  0.500      707  0.411  797 0.322 
11 - 20 Years      921  0.372    1,433  0.460   1,050  0.348  1,235 0.260 
21 + Years      704  0.235    1,096  0.397      838  0.220  1,311 0.199 
             
Race/Ethnicity             
Asian        63  0.367       308  0.453      199  0.213  165 0.386 
Black        53  0.193       442  0.471      259  0.185  119 0.240 
Hispanic        50  0.471       291  0.434      243  0.271  146 0.229 
White   2,984  0.401    3,559  0.478   2,745  0.362  3,616 0.273 
Other        74  0.273        37  0.512        39  0.387  117 0.709 
             
Gender             
Male   2,822  0.396    3,797  0.477   2,722  0.370  3,275 0.314 
Female      402  0.364       840  0.470      763  0.226  888 0.169 
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Table 5 
WLS Regression Analysis Explaining Determinants of Capital Structure at Privately Held Firms 
Panel A: Capital Structure as measured by the Ratio of Total Loans to Total Assets 
(Data are taken from the 1987, 1993, 1998 and 2003 Surveys of Small Business Finances) 
(a, b and c indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05  and 0.10 levels, respectively.) 
 
  1987 SSBF 1993 SSBF 1998 SSBF 2003 SSBF 
              
Observations      3,223        4,637       3,484       4,163   
              
F Value  23.10  a 24.06  a 24.72  a 18.58  a 
Root MSE  11.41   11.47   22.20   59.43   
Dep Mean  0.311   0.354   0.399   0.614   
Adj R-Sq  0.131   0.099   0.135   0.089   
Coeff Var  3673.19   3235.92   5569.71   9676.90   
               
Variable  Coef.  t-stat  Coef. t-stat  Coef. t-stat  Coef. t-stat  
              
Intercept  0.621 10.38 a 0.755 17.80 a 1.173 15.70 a 3.122 16.61 a 
Firm Characteristics              
ln (Assets)  -0.028 -5.52 a -0.032 -9.04 a -0.089 -14.36 a -0.248 -15.90 a 
ln (Firm Age)  -0.066 -8.76 a -0.053 -6.93 a -0.048 -4.15 a -0.091 -3.31 a 
ROA  -0.022 -2.64 a -0.018 -4.21 a -0.002 -0.21  -0.052 -2.28 b 
Cash to Assets  -0.347 -10.54 a -0.283 -12.16 a -0.199 -5.27 a -0.215 -2.35 b 
Tangible Assets to Assets  0.171 5.74 a 0.160 8.13 a 0.073 2.03 b 0.103 1.10  
Employment Growth Pos.  0.053 -0.59 a 0.020 1.56  n/a   0.006 0.08  
Employment Growth Neg.  -0.010 2.74 a 0.023 1.77 c n/a   0.396 4.30 a 
Trade Credit Paid Late 0.047 3.50 a 0.008 0.75  0.078 3.36 a 0.268 4.60 a 
Number of Banks  0.049 5.59 a 0.060 8.81 a 0.148 11.03 a 0.110 3.42 a 
Number of Nonbanks  0.065 9.69 a 0.047 9.76 a 0.121 13.16 a 0.216 10.47 a 
C-Corporation  0.085 5.33 a 0.035 2.59 a 0.201 7.10 a 0.481 6.12 a 
S-Corporation  0.149 6.83 a 0.075 5.14 a 0.216 8.34 a 0.406 6.79 a 
LLC        0.318 2.81 a -0.006 -0.03  
Partnership or LLP  0.070 2.85 a 0.021 1.02  0.114 2.81 a 0.252 2.72 a 
Race,Ethnicity,Sex              
Female Owner  0.024 1.31  -0.033 -2.51 b 0.014 0.61  -0.289 -5.08 a 
Black Owner  -0.061 -1.44  -0.069 -2.24 b -0.047 -0.93  0.018 0.15  
Asian Owner  -0.064 -1.69 c 0.000 0.01  -0.028 -0.57  0.014 0.12  
Hispanic Owner  -0.029 -0.63  -0.018 -0.69  -0.023 -0.54  -0.110 -0.93  
Industrial Classification              
SIC 2  -0.016 -0.44  0.012 0.42  -0.061 -1.04  0.015 0.10  
SIC 3  0.023 0.68  0.002 0.08  -0.001 -0.01  -0.038 -0.28  
SIC 4  0.025 0.60  0.045 1.33  0.131 2.24 b 0.248 1.76 c 
SIC 51  -0.002 -0.09  -0.042 -1.88 c -0.069 -1.47  -0.221 -1.81 c 
SIC 52  0.012 0.57  0.003 0.14  -0.065 -1.78 c -0.077 -0.84  
SIC 6  0.152 5.03 a 0.119 4.91 a 0.071 1.47  0.100 0.85  
SIC 7  0.045 1.93 c 0.017 0.95  -0.080 -2.28 b -0.070 -0.81  
SIC 8  0.018 0.72  0.036 1.89 c -0.102 -2.79 a -0.017 -0.18  
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Table 5 
WLS Regression Analysis Explaining Determinants of Capital Structure at Privately Held Firms 
Panel B: Capital Structure as measured by the Ratio of Total Liabilities to Total Assets 
(Data are taken from the 1987, 1993, 1998 and 2003 Surveys of Small Business Finances) 
(a, b and c indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively.) 
 
  1987 SSBF 1993 SSBF 1998 SSBF 2003 SSBF 
              
Observations      3,223        4,637       3,484       4,163   
              
F-Value  29.99  a 22.67  a 24.21  a 69.53  a 
Root MSE  13.68   13.19   40.04   23.92   
Dep Mean  0.477   0.561   0.756   0.849   
Adj R-Sq  0.165   0.0932   0.133   0.112   
Coeff Var  2868.48   2350.70   5295.26   8190.35   
              
                 
Variable  Coef. t-stat  Coef. t-stat  Coef. t-stat  Coef. t-stat  
              
Intercept  0.892 12.44 a 1.087 22.28 a 2.389 17.73 a 3.998 18.19 a 
Firm Characteristics              
ln (Assets)  -0.042 -6.96 a -0.049 -12.18 a -0.163 -14.49 a -0.323 -17.71 a 
ln (Firm Age)  -0.080 -8.81 a -0.046 -5.17 a -0.114 -5.51 a -0.116 -3.59 a 
ROA  -0.052 -5.13 a -0.002 -0.37  0.056 3.90 a -0.027 -1.02  
Cash to Assets  -0.316 -8.00 a -0.254 -9.50 a -0.271 -3.97 a -0.179 -1.67 c 
Tangible Assets to Assets  -0.058 -1.61  0.079 3.48 a -0.226 -3.35 a -0.078 -0.71  
Employment Growth Pos.  0.002 0.10  0.026 1.78  n/a   0.088 1.08  
Employment Growth Neg.  0.074 3.14 a 0.039 2.57 b n/a   0.426 3.96 a 
Trade Credit Paid Late 0.124 7.73 a 0.079 6.12 a 0.312 7.45 a 0.462 6.79 a 
Number of Banks  0.068 6.40 a 0.054 6.81 a 0.193 7.98 a 0.152 4.05 a 
Number of Nonbanks  0.075 9.31 a 0.049 8.77 a 0.162 9.80 a 0.255 10.58 a 
C-Corporation  0.178 9.34 a 0.107 6.82 a 0.381 7.45 a 0.710 7.72 a 
S-Corporation  0.228 8.74 a 0.143 8.50 a 0.335 7.16 a 0.614 8.78 a 
LLC  n/a   n/a   0.490 2.40 b 0.315 1.31  
Partnership or LLP  0.115 3.89 a 0.047 2.02 b 0.166 2.28 b 0.403 3.72 a 
Race,Ethnicity,Sex              
Female Owner  0.033 1.48  -0.018 -1.19  -0.016 -0.38  -0.333 -5.01 a 
Black Owner  -0.117 -2.31 b -0.033 -0.94  -0.108 -1.19  0.109 0.74  
Asian Owner  -0.035 -0.77  -0.009 -0.28  -0.131 -1.50  0.015 0.11  
Hispanic Owner  0.030 0.55  -0.008 -0.27  -0.099 -1.28  -0.134 -0.97  
Industrial Classification              
SIC 2  -0.039 -0.92  -0.018 -0.52  -0.266 -2.53 b -0.061 -0.34  
SIC 3  0.006 0.15  0.014 0.43  -0.218 -2.26 b -0.023 -0.14  
SIC 4  -0.073 -1.49  0.047 1.20  0.134 1.27  0.244 1.47  
SIC 51  0.066 2.05 b -0.002 -0.06  -0.130 -1.55  -0.201 -1.41  
SIC 52  -0.024 -0.94  -0.032 -1.58  -0.255 -3.87 a -0.113 -1.06  
SIC 6  0.137 3.77 a 0.076 2.74 a -0.100 -1.15  0.062 0.45  
SIC 7  0.017 0.62  -0.015 -0.73  -0.266 -4.22 a -0.140 -1.39  
SIC 8  -0.036 -1.19  -0.028 -1.27  -0.277 -4.20 a -0.026 -0.25  
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1987 SSBF 1993 SSBF 1998 SSBF 2003 SSBF
Number of Observations 1,772      2,704      1,864      2,473      
F Value 14.00 a 20.87 a 17.29 a 20.16 a
Root MSE 11.40 9.93 20.44 53.43
Dep Mean 0.353 0.386 0.491 0.747
Adj R-Sq 0.139 0.139 0.149 0.146
     
Variable Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat
Intercept 0.981 10.90 a 0.712 11.29 a 1.846 15.54 a 4.525 16.01 a
Firm Characteristics  
ln (Assets) -0.050 -7.43 a -0.037 -8.24 a -0.124 -14.47 a -0.342 -16.05 a
ln (Firm Age) -0.071 -6.62 a -0.051 -5.03 a -0.040 -2.44 b -0.105 -2.77 a
ROA -0.048 -3.90 a -0.035 -5.46 a 0.000 -0.03 -0.196 -6.01 a
Cash to Assets -0.228 -4.00 a -0.217 -5.32 a -0.324 -4.93 a -0.110 -0.73  
Tangible Assets to Assets 0.208 5.20 a 0.274 10.10 a 0.170 3.33 a 0.279 2.42 b
Employment Growth Positive -0.018 -0.85 0.037 2.27 b n/a n/a 0.067 0.81
Employment Growth Negative 0.051 1.98 b 0.035 2.00 b n/a n/a 0.656 5.80 a
Trade Credit Paid Late 0.059 3.20 a 0.036 2.61 a 0.113 3.78 a 0.287 3.89 a
Number of Banks 0.030 2.67 a 0.032 3.91 a 0.101 5.65 a 0.110 2.76 a
Number of Nonbanks 0.047 5.15 a 0.029 5.38 a 0.069 5.74 a 0.138 5.65 a
Race, Ethnicity, Sex
Female Owner -0.055 -1.70 -0.055 -3.19 a 0.049 1.40 -0.214 -2.70 a
Black Owner -0.029 -0.39 -0.044 -0.93  -0.113 -1.49 -0.431 -2.00 b
Asian Owner -0.054 -0.95 -0.022 -0.60 -0.138 -1.97 b -0.293 -2.05 b
Hispanic Owner 0.012 0.18 0.074 1.93 -0.028 -0.43 -0.259 -1.61
Industrial Classification  
SIC 2 0.004 0.09 0.066 1.89 -0.064 -0.83 0.401 2.13 b
SIC 3 -0.029 -0.69 0.034 1.07 0.005 0.07 0.090 0.56
SIC 4 0.018 0.36 0.068 1.77 0.053 0.72  0.490 2.77 a
SIC 51 -0.046 -1.34 -0.038 -1.45 -0.066 -1.13 0.076 0.55
SIC 52 -0.044 -1.34 0.017 0.73  -0.127 -2.38 b 0.072 0.60
SIC 6 0.095 2.27 b 0.083 2.70 a 0.002 0.03 0.159 0.98
SIC 7 -0.038 -1.13  0.039 1.63  -0.142 -2.78 a 0.039 0.34
SIC 8 -0.065 -1.65 0.080 2.99 a -0.121 -2.23 b 0.141 1.18
Table 6
WLS Regression Analysis Explaining Determinants of Capital Structure at Privately Held Corporations
Panel A: Capital Structure as measured by the Ratio of Total Loans to Total Assets
Data are taken from the 1987, 1993, 1998 and 2003 Surveys of Small Business Finances
a, b indicate statistical significance at the 0.01 and 0.05 levels, respectively.
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1987 SSBF 1993 SSBF 1998 SSBF 2003 SSBF
Observations 1,772      2,704      1,864      2,473      
F-Value 14.18 14.13 17.77 2..21
Root MSE 13.92 11.90 35.07 62.66
Dep Mean 0.567 0.617 0.892 1.050
Adj R-Sq 0.141 965 0.153 0.165
Variable Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat
Intercept 1.561 14.21 a 1.159 15.34 a 3.357 16.47 a 5.899 17.80 a
Firm Characteristics
ln (Assets) -0.065 -7.93 a -0.054 -9.92 a -0.196 -13.41 a -0.441 -18.14 a
ln (Firm Age) -0.093 -7.06 a -0.049 -4.04 a -0.093 -3.34 a -0.112 -2.51 b
ROA -0.093 -6.14 a -0.118 -2.29 b 0.069 3.41 a -0.206 -5.41 a
Cash to Assets -0.318 -5.51 a -0.198 -4.07 a -0.596 -5.29 a 0.067 -0.38
Tangible Assets to Assets -0.040 -0.81 0.163 5.00 a -0.028 -0.32 0.045 0.33
Employment Growth Positive -0.010 -0.40 0.052 2.65 a n/a n/a 0.215 2.24
Employment Growth Negative 0.068 2.13 b 0.053 2.57 b n/a n/a 0.732 5.51 a
Trade Credit Paid Late 0.124 5.74 a 0.095 5.70 a 0.311 6.05 a 0.523 6.04 a
Number of Banks 0.050 3.65 a 0.037 3.73 a 0.133 4.35 a 0.174 3.72 a
Number of Nonbanks 0.054 4.78 a 0.037 5.68 a 0.091 4.42 a 0.173 6.02 a
Race, Ethnicity and Gender
Female Owner -0.016 -0.48 -0.019 -0.93 0.113 1.89 -0.311 -3.34 a
Black Owner -0.075 -0.81 b -0.012 -0.21 -0.224 -1.72 -0.248 -0.98
Asian Owner -0.131 -1.90 -0.061 -1.42 -0.252 -2.09 b -0.341 -2.03 b
Hispanic Owner 0.085 1.06 0.074 1.62 -0.081 -0.71 -0.369 -1.96 b
Industrial Classification
SIC 2 -0.040 -0.73 0.019 0.47 -0.321 -2.42 b 0.410 1.86
SIC 3 -0.062 -1.23 0.020 0.53 -0.170 -1.46  0.216 1.15
SIC 4 -0.083 -1.32 0.043 1.01 0.041 0.33 0.426 2.05 b
SIC 51 0.014 0.34  0.002 0.05 0.148 -1.47 0.152 0.94
SIC 52 -0.074 -1.84 -0.002 -0.07 -0.328 -3.57 a 0.159 1.14
SIC 6 0.079 1.54  0.023 0.63 a -0.145 -1.28 0.101 0.53
SIC 7 -0.086 -2.08 b -0.013 -0.44 -0.366 -4.16 a -0.019 -0.14
SIC 8 -0.169 -3.52 a -0.029 -0.93 -0.301 -3.25 a 0.093 0.67
Table 6
WLS Regression Analysis Explaining Determinants of Capital Structure at Privately Held Corporations
Panel B: Capital Structure as measured by the Ratio of Total Liabilities to Total Assets
Data are taken from the 1987, 1993, 1998 and 2003 Surveys of Small Business Finances
a, b indicate statistical significance at the 0.01 and 0.05 levels, respectively.
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Appendix Table A1 
Descriptive Statistics for Variables Used to Explain Determinants of Capital Structure 
Panel A: 1987 SSBF 
      
Variable Median Mean Std Error Minimum Maximum 
Loans to Assets 0.177 0.312 0.007 0 1.89 
Liabilities to Asset 0.394 0.478 0.008 0 2.58 
Assets 99,000 476,254 43,080 0   154,087,353 
Sales 250,000  1,251,382 108,277 180 202,000,000 
Employment 4 11.145 0.484 0.5 475 
Firm Age 10 13.265 0.207 0 118 
ROA 0.207 0.557 0.014 -0.325 2.38 
Cash to Assets 0.085 0.162 0.004 -0.044 1 
Tangible Assets to Assets 0.667 0.615 0.005 0.005 1 
Employment Growth is Pos. 0 0.242 0.007 0 1 
Employment Growth is Neg. 0 0.125 0.006 0 1 
Trade Credit Paid Late 0 0.420 0.009 0 1 
Number of Banks 1 1.317 0.013 0 12 
Number of Nonbanks 0 0.725 0.017 0 11 
Number of Fin'l Institutions 2 2.042 0.023 0 12 
C-Corporation 0 0.392 0.009 0 1 
S-Corporation 0 0.124 0.006 0 1 
Partnership or LLP 0 0.081 0.005 0 1 
Proprietorship 0 0.403 0.009 0 1 
Female Owner 0 0.138 0.006 0 1 
Asian Owner 0 0.023 0.003 0 1 
Black Owner 0 0.030 0.003 0 1 
Hispanic Owner 0 0.020 0.002 0 1 
SIC1 0 0.131 0.006 0 1 
SIC2 0 0.042 0.004 0 1 
SIC3 0 0.048 0.004 0 1 
SIC4 0 0.029 0.003 0 1 
SIC51 0 0.100 0.005 0 1 
SIC52 0 0.264 0.008 0 1 
SIC6 0 0.068 0.004 0 1 
SIC7 0 0.184 0.007 0 1 
SIC8 0 0.132 0.006 0 1 
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Appendix Table A1 
Descriptive Statistics for Variables Used to Explain Determinants of Capital Structure 
Panel B: 1993 SSBF 
  
Variable Median Mean Std Error Minimum Maximum 
Loans to Assets 0.2513755 0.354 0.005 0 1.21 
Liabilities to Asset 0.4737549 0.561 0.006 0 1.59 
Assets              69,435             488,844               40,729  0    238,655,000  
Sales            190,000          1,001,330               64,368  0    335,660,000  
Employment 3 8.494 0.336 0.5 495 
Firm Age 11 14.284 0.178 0 216 
ROA 0.213 0.690 0.019 -1.05 4.23 
Cash to Assets 0.108 0.197 0.004 -0.026 1 
Tangible Assets to Assets 0.700 0.656 0.004 0.000 1.000 
Employment Growth is Pos. 0 0.377 0.007 0 1 
Employment Growth is Neg. 0 0.268 0.007 0 1 
Bus Delinquencies 0 0.190 0.006 0 1 
Trade Credit Paid Late 0 0.363 0.007 0 1 
Number of Banks 1 1.262 0.012 0 13 
Number of Nonbanks 1 0.844 0.017 0 13 
Number of Fin'l Institutions 2 2.106 0.021 0 19 
C-Corporation 0 0.284 0.007 0 1 
S-Corporation 0 0.203 0.006 0 1 
Partnership or LLP 0 0.080 0.004 0 1 
Proprietorship 0 0.432 0.007 0 1 
Female Owner 0 0.206 0.006 0 1 
Asian Owner 0 0.036 0.003 0 1 
Black Owner 0 0.029 0.002 0 1 
Hispanic Owner 0 0.043 0.003 0 1 
SIC1 0 0.142 0.005 0 1 
SIC2 0 0.039 0.003 0 1 
SIC3 0 0.042 0.003 0 1 
SIC4 0 0.028 0.002 0 1 
SIC51 0 0.085 0.004 0 1 
SIC52 0 0.217 0.006 0 1 
SIC6 0 0.071 0.004 0 1 
SIC7 0 0.211 0.006 0 1 
SIC8 0 0.166 0.005 0 1 
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Appendix Table A1 
Descriptive Statistics for Variables Used to Explain Determinants of Capital Structure 
Panel C: 1998 SSBF 
  
Variable Median Mean Std Error Minimum Maximum 
Loans to Assets 0.092 0.399 0.011 0 2.27 
Liabilities to Asset 0.347 0.756 0.019 0 4.26 
Assets 
   
58,113  
  
424,989 
  
34,339 
   
10  
  
99,912,000 
Sales 
   
160,000  
  
1,005,846 
  
109,076 0    624,000,000 
Employment 3 8.715 0.398 1 482 
Firm Age 11 13.392 0.188 0 104 
ROA 0.336 0.873 0.023 -1.45 3.74 
Cash to Assets 0.117 0.243 0.005 -0.052 1 
Bus Delinquencies 0 0.136 0.006 0 1 
Trade Credit Paid Late 0 0.270 0.008 0 1 
Number of Banks 1 1.226 0.013 0 13 
Number of Nonbanks 1 0.839 0.019 0 15 
Number of Fin'l Institutions 2 2.065 0.024 0 20 
C-Corporation 0 0.193 0.007 0 1 
S-Corporation 0 0.243 0.007 0 1 
LLC 0 0.008 0.001 0 1 
Partnership or LLP 0 0.068 0.004 0 1 
Proprietorship 0 0.488 0.008 0 1 
Female Owner 0 0.238 0.007 0 1 
Asian Owner 0 0.043 0.003 0 1 
Black Owner 0 0.040 0.003 0 1 
Hispanic Owner 0 0.056 0.004 0 1 
SIC1 0 0.119 0.005 0 1 
SIC2 0 0.038 0.003 0 1 
SIC3 0 0.047 0.004 0 1 
SIC4 0 0.037 0.003 0 1 
SIC51 0 0.072 0.004 0 1 
SIC52 0 0.192 0.007 0 1 
SIC6 0 0.064 0.004 0 1 
SIC7 0 0.246 0.007 0 1 
SIC8 0 0.183 0.007 0 1 
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Appendix Table A1 
Descriptive Statistics for Variables Used to Explain Determinants of Capital Structure 
Panel D: 2003 SSBF 
  
Variable Median Mean Std Error Minimum Maximum 
Loans to Assets 0.074 0.614 0.025 0 11.3 
Liabilities to Asset 0.275 0.849 0.030 0 12.8 
Assets 72,000 567,881 47,831 16 235,027,709 
Sales 200,000 1,098,386 73,880 0 210,861,289 
Employment 3 8.736 0.333 0 486 
Firm Age 12 14.381 0.172 1 103 
ROA 0.287 0.749 0.018 -1.000 3.000 
Cash to Assets 0.105 0.225 0.004 -0.080 1.000 
Tangible Assets to Assets 0.545 0.513 0.005 0.000 1.000 
Employment Growth Positive 0 0.154 0.006 0 1 
Employment Growth Negative 0 0.077 0.006 0 1 
Bus Delinquencies 0 0.159 0.006 0 1 
Trade Credit Paid Late 0 0.247 0.007 0 1 
Number of Banks 1 1.246 0.013 0 20 
Number of Nonbanks 1 1.165 0.019 0 11 
Number of Fin'l Institutions 2 2.411 0.024 0 20 
C-Corporation 0 0.146 0.005 0 1 
S-Corporation 0 0.314 0.007 0 1 
LLC 0 0.014 0.002 0 1 
Partnership or LLP 0 0.086 0.004 0 1 
Proprietorship 0 0.440 0.008 0 1 
Female Owner 0 0.258 0.007 0 1 
Asian Owner 0 0.045 0.003 0 1 
Black Owner 0 0.038 0.003 0 1 
Hispanic Owner 0 0.043 0.003 0 1 
SIC1 0 0.116 0.005 0 1 
SIC2 0 0.031 0.003 0 1 
SIC3 0 0.041 0.003 0 1 
SIC4 0 0.039 0.003 0 1 
SIC51 0 0.060 0.004 0 1 
SIC52 0 0.186 0.006 0 1 
SIC6 0 0.070 0.004 0 1 
SIC7 0 0.249 0.007 0 1 
SIC8 0 0.207 0.006 0 1 
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Appendix Table A2A 
Capital Ratios by Selected Firm and Owner Characteristics 
Data from 1987 SSBF 
Panel A: Capital Structure as Measured by the Ratio of Loans to Assets 
     
      
Variable Obs. Median Mean Std Error 
Loans to Assets 3,224 0.177 0.312 0.007 
     
Organizational Form Obs Median Mean Std Error 
Proprietorship   1,195 0.051 0.253 0.011 
Partnership or LLP      255 0.245 0.340 0.023 
S-Corporation      449 0.284 0.414 0.022 
C-Corporation   1,325 0.236 0.334 0.010 
LLC     
     
Asset Quartile Obs Median Mean Std Error 
1 (Largest)      806 0.273 0.345 0.011 
2      806 0.241 0.334 0.012 
3      806 0.181 0.300 0.012 
4 (Smallest)      806 0.000 0.288 0.017 
     
Firm Age Obs Median Mean Std Error 
0 - 5 Years      861 0.294 0.390 0.014 
6  - 10 Years      738 0.189 0.331 0.016 
11 - 20 Years      921 0.177 0.285 0.011 
21 + Years      704 0.055 0.213 0.013 
     
Race/Ethnicity Obs Median Mean Std Error 
Asian         63 0.144 0.310 0.054 
Black         53 0.084 0.252 0.046 
Hispanic         50 0.211 0.310 0.046 
White   2,984 0.188 0.316 0.007 
Other         74 0.091 0.183 0.029 
     
Gender Obs Median Mean Std Error 
Male   2,822 0.187 0.312 0.007 
Female      402 0.114 0.311 0.021 
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Appendix Table A2A 
Capital Ratios by Selected Firm and Owner Characteristics 
Data from 1987 SSBF 
Panel B: Capital Structure as Measured by the Ratio of Liabilities to Assets 
 
     
Variable Obs. Median Mean Std Error 
Liabilities to Assets 3,224 0.394 0.478 0.008 
     
Organizational Form  Obs Median Mean Std Error 
Proprietorship   1,195 0.223 0.362 0.012 
Partnership or LLP      255 0.414 0.488 0.029 
S-Corporation      449 0.542 0.618 0.025 
C-Corporation   1,325 0.481 0.551 0.013 
LLC     
     
Asset Quartile  Obs Median Mean Std Error 
1 (Largest)      806 0.545 0.561 0.012 
2      806 0.444 0.503 0.014 
3      806 0.356 0.449 0.015 
4 (Smallest)      806 0.222 0.444 0.021 
     
Firm Age  Obs Median Mean Std Error 
0 - 5 Years      861 0.529 0.576 0.017 
6  - 10 Years      738 0.414 0.513 0.019 
11 - 20 Years      921 0.372 0.441 0.014 
21 + Years      704 0.235 0.347 0.015 
     
Race/Ethnicity  Obs Median Mean Std Error 
Asian         63 0.367 0.501 0.065 
Black         53 0.193 0.345 0.048 
Hispanic         50 0.471 0.534 0.062 
White   2,984 0.401 0.484 0.009 
Other         74 0.273 0.312 0.032 
     
Gender  Obs Median Mean Std Error 
Male   2,822 0.396 0.479 0.009 
Female      402 0.364 0.474 0.026 
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Appendix Table A2B 
Capital Ratios by Selected Firm and Owner Characteristics 
Data from 1993 SSBF 
Panel A: Capital Structure as Measured by the Ratio of Loans to Assets 
     
     
Variable  Median Mean Std Error 
Loans to Assets  0.251 0.354 0.005 
     
Organizational Form  Obs Median Mean Std Error 
Proprietorship   1,492 0.196 0.323 0.009 
Partnership or LLP      337 0.259 0.347 0.020 
S-Corporation   1,100 0.352 0.420 0.011 
C-Corporation   1,708 0.254 0.358 0.009 
LLC     
     
Asset Quartile  Obs Median Mean Std Error 
1 (Largest)   1,160 0.207 0.357 0.012 
2   1,159 0.255 0.358 0.011 
3   1,159 0.266 0.349 0.010 
4 (Smallest)   1,159 0.264 0.345 0.009 
     
Firm Age  Obs Median Mean Std Error 
0 - 5 Years      956 0.364 0.419 0.013 
6  - 10 Years   1,152 0.280 0.365 0.011 
11 - 20 Years   1,433 0.235 0.338 0.009 
21 + Years   1,096 0.182 0.299 0.011 
     
Race/Ethnicity  Obs Median Mean Std Error 
Asian      308 0.248 0.353 0.021 
Black      442 0.211 0.313 0.017 
Hispanic      291 0.222 0.321 0.021 
White   3,559 0.256 0.358 0.006 
Other         37 0.237 0.343 0.065 
     
Gender  Obs Median Mean Std Error 
Male   3,797 0.254 0.357 0.006 
Female      840 0.226 0.344 0.013 
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Appendix Table A2B 
Capital Ratios by Selected Firm and Owner Characteristics 
Data from 1993 SSBF 
Panel B: Capital Structure as Measured by the Ratio of Liabilities to Assets 
 
     
Variable  Median Mean Std Error 
Liabilities to Assets  0.474 0.561 0.006 
     
Organizational Form  Obs Median Mean Std Error 
Proprietorship   1,492 0.414 0.505 0.011 
Partnership or LLP      337 0.428 0.541 0.023 
S-Corporation   1,100 0.578 0.650 0.013 
C-Corporation   1,708 0.515 0.587 0.010 
LLC     
     
Asset Quartile  Obs Median Mean Std Error 
1 (Largest)   1,160 0.500 0.599 0.013 
2   1,159 0.448 0.552 0.013 
3   1,159 0.457 0.522 0.011 
4 (Smallest)   1,159 0.512 0.553 0.010 
     
Firm Age  Obs Median Mean Std Error 
0 - 5 Years      956 0.563 0.626 0.014 
6  - 10 Years   1,152 0.500 0.587 0.013 
11 - 20 Years   1,433 0.460 0.538 0.011 
21 + Years   1,096 0.397 0.495 0.012 
     
Race/Ethnicity  Obs Median Mean Std Error 
Asian      308 0.453 0.542 0.024 
Black      442 0.471 0.559 0.020 
Hispanic      291 0.434 0.535 0.025 
White   3,559 0.478 0.562 0.007 
Other         37 0.512 0.652 0.081 
     
Gender  Obs Median Mean Std Error 
Male   3,797 0.477 0.560 0.007 
Female      840 0.470 0.566 0.015 
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Appendix Table A2C 
Capital Ratios by Selected Firm and Owner Characteristics 
Data from 1998 SSBF 
Panel A: Capital Structure as Measured by the Ratio of Loans to Assets 
 
      
Variable  Median Mean Std Error 
Loans to Assets  0.092 0.399 0.011 
     
Organizational Form Obs Median Mean Std Error 
Proprietorship 1375 0.000 0.313 0.016 
Partnership or LLP 218 0.182 0.392 0.037 
S-Corporation 1013 0.257 0.505 0.020 
C-Corporation 851 0.231 0.474 0.022 
LLC 28 0.538 0.576 0.113 
     
Asset Quartile Obs Median Mean Std Error 
1 (Largest) 871 0.215 0.320 0.012 
2 870 0.184 0.361 0.016 
3 871 0.129 0.409 0.020 
4 (Smallest) 873 0.000 0.450 0.027 
     
Firm Age Obs Median Mean Std Error 
0 - 5 Years 890 0.087 0.473 0.023 
6  - 10 Years 707 0.161 0.425 0.023 
11 - 20 Years 1050 0.106 0.377 0.018 
21 + Years 838 0.022 0.301 0.019 
     
Race/Ethnicity Obs Median Mean Std Error 
Asian 199 0.036 0.354 0.042 
Black 259 0.027 0.409 0.043 
Hispanic 243 0.046 0.382 0.039 
White 2745 0.098 0.402 0.012 
Other 39 0.154 0.383 0.093 
     
Gender Obs Median Mean Std Error 
Male 2722 0.110 0.391 0.011 
Female 763 0.006 0.423 0.025 
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Appendix Table A2C 
Capital Ratios by Selected Firm and Owner Characteristics 
Data from 1998 SSBF 
Panel B: Capital Structure as Measured by the Ratio of Liabilities to Assets 
 
     
Variable  Median Mean Std Error 
Liabilities to Assets  0.347 0.756 0.019 
     
Organizational Form Obs Median Mean Std Error 
Proprietorship 1375 0.111 0.635 0.031 
Partnership or LLP 218 0.400 0.722 0.070 
S-Corporation 1013 0.558 0.898 0.034 
C-Corporation 851 0.536 0.886 0.039 
LLC 28 0.577 1.002 0.201 
     
Asset Quartile Obs Median Mean Std Error 
1 (Largest) 871 0.436 0.544 0.017 
2 870 0.414 0.633 0.027 
3 871 0.381 0.760 0.035 
4 (Smallest) 873 0.025 0.940 0.051 
     
Firm Age Obs Median Mean Std Error 
0 - 5 Years 890 0.421 0.916 0.043 
6  - 10 Years 707 0.411 0.834 0.043 
11 - 20 Years 1050 0.348 0.683 0.031 
21 + Years 838 0.220 0.564 0.032 
     
Race/Ethnicity Obs Median Mean Std Error 
Asian 199 0.213 0.610 0.071 
Black 259 0.185 0.765 0.076 
Hispanic 243 0.271 0.670 0.066 
White 2745 0.362 0.768 0.021 
Other 39 0.387 0.799 0.187 
     
Gender Obs Median Mean Std Error 
Male 2722 0.370 0.750 0.021 
Female 763 0.226 0.776 0.045 
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Appendix Table A2D 
Capital Ratios by Selected Firm and Owner Characteristics 
Data from 2003 SSBF 
Panel A: Capital Structure as Measured by the Ratio of Loans to Assets 
  
     
Variable  Median Mean Std Error 
Loans to Assets 4163 0.074 0.614 0.025 
     
Organizational Form Obs Median Mean Std Error 
Proprietorship 1,298 0.000 0.498 0.045 
Partnership or LLP 337 0.141 0.548 0.063 
S-Corporation 1,532 0.237 0.759 0.046 
C-Corporation 941 0.261 0.719 0.050 
LLC 55 0.169 0.339 0.056 
     
Asset Quartile Obs Median Mean Std Error 
1 (Largest) 1,040 0.206 0.350 0.013 
2 1,041 0.215 0.369 0.016 
3 1,041 0.115 0.466 0.033 
4 (Smallest) 1,041 0.000 0.974 0.076 
     
Firm Age Obs Median Mean Std Error 
0 - 5 Years 820 0.141 0.859 0.072 
6  - 10 Years 797 0.128 0.585 0.050 
11 - 20 Years 1,235 0.062 0.541 0.042 
21 + Years 1,311 0.033 0.478 0.039 
     
Race/Ethnicity Obs Median Mean Std Error 
Asian 165 0.111 0.582 0.112 
Black 119 0.000 0.775 0.176 
Hispanic 146 0.018 0.530 0.110 
White 3,616 0.074 0.591 0.026 
Other 117 0.512 2.047 0.342 
     
Gender Obs Median Mean Std Error 
Male 3,275 0.111 0.655 0.030 
Female 888 0.000 0.496 0.046 
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Appendix Table A2D 
Capital Ratios by Selected Firm and Owner Characteristics 
Data from 2003 SSBF 
Panel B: Capital Structure as Measured by the Ratio of Liabilities to Assets 
     
     
Variable  Median Mean Std Error 
Liabilities to Assets 4,163 0.275 0.849 0.030 
     
Organizational Form Obs Median Mean Std Error 
Proprietorship 1,298 0.080 0.654 0.052 
Partnership or LLP 337 0.313 0.784 0.078 
S-Corporation 1,532 0.500 1.069 0.055 
C-Corporation 941 0.555 1.009 0.059 
LLC 55 0.459 0.771 0.171 
     
Asset Quartile Obs Median Mean Std Error 
1 (Largest) 1,040 0.448 0.531 0.014 
2 1,041 0.386 0.538 0.021 
3 1,041 0.271 0.623 0.038 
4 (Smallest) 1,041 0.069 1.335 0.090 
     
Firm Age Obs Median Mean Std Error 
0 - 5 Years 820 0.451 1.149 0.083 
6  - 10 Years 797 0.322 0.878 0.066 
11 - 20 Years 1,235 0.260 0.733 0.048 
21 + Years 1,311 0.199 0.658 0.046 
     
Race/Ethnicity Obs Median Mean Std Error 
Asian 165 0.386 0.831 0.128 
Black 119 0.240 1.113 0.234 
Hispanic 146 0.229 0.769 0.127 
White 3,616 0.273 0.819 0.031 
Other 117 0.709 2.354 0.383 
     
Gender Obs Median Mean Std Error 
Male 3,275 0.314 0.893 0.035 
Female 888 0.169 0.721 0.057 
     
 
